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ECONOMICS 
 
 
 
 
This author analyses the internatio-
nal membership of the boards of direc-
tors of Russia’s ten largest outbound in-
vestors. The data used in the study come 
from the companies’ annual reports and 
official websites. The information is cor-
rect as of February 2017. It is concluded 
that foreign nationals hold 30 % of board 
seats in Russia’s ten largest non-finan-
cial companies investing abroad. US, 
British, and German nationals comprise 
two-thirds of foreign nationals on the 
boards of directors. Among the 30 for-
eign holders of board seats, there is only 
one citizen of China. Women account for 
five percent of directors in Russia’s ten 
largest investors overseas. The propor-
tion of female directors in Russia’s 50 
largest corporations is similar. This sug-
gests that internationalisation of Russian 
companies has not improved the chances 
for women to enter boards of directors. 
 
Key words: boards of directors, Rus-
sia’s top multinational corporations, wo-
men on boards of directors, corporate go-
vernance, Russian FDI abroad 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Over four million enterprises are 
registered in Russia [1]. A considera-
ble part of them is not operating. De-
spite a significant number of busi-
nesses, a rather small number of large 
companies account for the majority 
of the Russian GDP, exports and in-
vestments abroad. At the beginning 
of this decade, the Russian outward 
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foreign direct investment (FDI1) stock was $336 billion, i. e. roughly the 
same amount as at the end of 2016 (Table 1). 
 
Table 1 
 
Russia’s outward FDI stock and annual FDI outflow in selected years2 
 
 1995 2000 2005 2010 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Russia’s outward 
FDI stock, $ mil-
lion 3,346 19,211 139,241 336,355 385,321 329,817 282,651 335,791 
Russia’s share in 
the world’s out-
ward FDI stock, % 0.08 0.26 1.17 1.60 1.55 1.34 1.13 1.28 
Russia’s annual 
FDI outflow, $ mil-
lion 606 3,152 16,747 41,116 70,685 64,203 27,090 27,272 
Russia’s share in 
the world’s annu-
al FDI outflow, % 0.17 0.27 1.99 2.97 5.05 5.12 1.70 1.88 
 
Source: [4]. 
 
After the escalation of the Ukrainian crisis (2014 — onwards), Russia’s 
outbound FDI flow have withered. There are three main reasons for the de-
cline. Firstly, lower oil prices have caused a lack of capital for new invest-
ments. It seems that Russia’s FDI outflow follows rather closely fluctuations 
of oil prices (Fig. 1). Secondly, high interest rates for bank loans (currently 
over ten percent) make it very expensive to invest either in Russia or outside 
the country. And finally, the weak exchange rate of the Russian rouble 
makes foreign investments more expensive than before the substantial weak-
ening of the rouble in the autumn of 2014 (Fig. 2). At the end of 2016, Rus-
sian capital represented 1—2 percent of the global outward FDI. 
                                                     
1 Foreign direct investment (FDI) is defined as an investment by a resident entity in 
one economy that reflects the objective of obtaining a lasting interest in an enterprise 
resident in another economy. The lasting interest implies the existence of a long-term 
relationship between the direct investor and the enterprise, and a significant degree of 
influence, by the direct investor, on the management of the enterprise. The ownership 
of at least ten percent of the voting power, representing the influence by the investor, is 
the basic criterion used. Hence, control by the foreign investor (ownership of more 
than 50 percent of the voting power) is not required. In turn, an outward FDI stock is 
the total foreign direct investment of the reporting economy held abroad [2]. 
2 The figures offered by Bank of Russia, the Central Bank of Russia, differ to some 
extent from the figures provided by the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, UNCTAD [3]. The UNCTAD statistics are used in this study, since 
they offer a longer time period for analysing the Russian FDI abroad. The FDI sta-
tistics of the Central Bank of Russia available to the public start from the year 2009. 
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Fig. 1. Annual fluctuations of Russia’s FDI outflow and oil price  
(Brent average annual price) 
 
Sources: [4—5]. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. The value of the Russian Rouble against the US dollar since  
the beginning of 20133 
 
Source: [3]. 
 
Two-thirds of the Russian total outward FDI landed in the EU, as of the 
end of 2016. However, one should not take the geographical division of the 
Russian outward FDI stock too literally, as a big part of the Russian outward 
FDI does not stay in the first foreign country in which they have been in-
vested. In fact, a substantial share of the Russian outward FDI returns to 
Russia. As an indication of a gargantuan capital boomerang, one can take the 
FDI moves between Russia and Cyprus. Cyprus covered over 40 percent of 
the Russian outward FDI stock, and correspondingly, the Cypriot share in 
the Russian inward FDI stock was nearly 40 percent, at the end of 2016 [6]. 
                                                     
3 Note: when the curve goes up, the exchange rate of the Russian Rouble weakens. 
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1. The structure and the objective of research 
 
Corporate governance has been a little studied research theme in the con-
text of the Russian outbound FDI [7]4. After analysing earlier studies on the 
relationship between the board composition and outbound FDI in Russia’s 
(Chapter 2.1), the author reviews earlier findings related to the relationship 
between the board composition and an FDI decision by a company in a non-
Russian context (Chapter 2.2). After conducting the literature review, the 
author analyses foreign members of the boards of directors of Russia’s ten 
leading non-financial corporations in terms of their foreign assets (Chap-
ter 3). A study by A. V. Kuznetsov [10] was extremely useful in identifying 
these companies (Table 2). 
 
Table 2 
 
Russia’s 10 leading non-financial corporations,  
in terms of their foreign assets, in 2014 
 
Company, industry Turnover, $ billion* 
Foreign  
assets, 
$ billion** 
Foreign  
assets/total 
assets, %** 
1. Gazprom, oil and gas 133.3 36.0 13 
2. Lukoil, oil and gas 98.5 32.9 29 
3. VimpelCom, telecom 9.1 30.4 74 
4. Rosneft, oil and gas 82.3 9.4 6 
5. Evraz, metallurgy 11.9 5.3 46 
6. Sovcomflot (SFC), maritime transport 1.0 5.3 83 
7. Rusal, metallurgy 8.1 2.8 19 
8. Russian Railways (RZD), rail transport 45.7 2.8 4 
9. TMK, production of metal pipelines 5.3 2.5 44 
10. Zarubezhneft, oil and gas 0.8 2.4 67 
 
The turnover figures were converted from RUR into USD, using the annual av-
erage rate of 2014, i. e. RUR 38.6 against USD 1 [12]. 
 
Sources: * [11], ** [12, p. 82]. 
 
A selection of the ten largest corporations, with the largest assets abroad, 
does not offer a representative sample, and hence, does not allow us to gen-
eralise the findings. Despite this limitation, the method used has its 
                                                     
4 Tepavcevic [8] and Liuhto [9] have analysed the relationship between the owner-
ship and the outbound investment of Russian companies. However, none of the afo-
rementioned authors focused on the impact of the board composition on the outward 
investment of Russia firms. 
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strengths. We should not forget that the studied companies account for over 
a third of Russia’s total outward FDI stock. To put it differently, even if the 
selected companies do not form a representative sample, they form an eco-
nomically purposeful sample [13]. 
Here, we should acknowledge that companies and their governance 
structures constantly evolve, and therefore, it needs to be stressed that the 
author describes the situation as the companies reported it, in their annual 
reports or on their websites, in February 2017. 
In this study, a person who is born outside the USSR and who does not 
hold Russian citizenship is regarded as a foreigner. The author could detect 
several persons who have non-Russian citizenship; but, as they were born in 
the USSR, they have not been classified as foreigners. The aforementioned 
definition has been created in order to be able to accomplish this research, 
since the author was unable to verify, whether the persons living outside 
Russia hold a dual citizenship, i. e. a citizenship of the post-Soviet republic 
plus a Russian citizenship. The aforementioned definition used in this re-
search should not be regarded as a political statement. 
The main objective of this article is to study foreign members on the 
boards of directors of Russia’s ten largest outbound investors. 
 
 
2. Earlier research on the relations between the board composition  
and internationalisation with a special focus on foreign nationals  
in the board of directors 
 
2.1. Earlier research into the Russian context 
 
Ruzhanskaya [14] conducted research on 100 Russian companies operat-
ing in the Urals area in 2006. The author found that foreign citizens occupied 
1.4 percent of the board seats in the studied enterprises. When the share of 
foreign citizens on the board of large and small companies was compared, 
and no major statistical differences were found. Surprisingly, the medium-
sized companies studied did not have any foreigners on their board of direc-
tors. As the sample was relatively small, one should not draw any firm con-
clusions on the relationship between the company size and the representation 
of foreigners in the board of the Russian companies on the basis of the 
aforementioned work. 
Kuznetsov and Chetverikova analysed Russia’s 20 most multinational 
companies in 2008 [15]. They found out that 14 out of the 20 companies 
studied had foreigners on their board of directors. On average, foreigners 
occupied nearly 30 percent of the board seats in these 20 companies. It is 
interesting to observe that the respective share in Russia’s ten most multina-
tional enterprises was more or less the same as in the 20 largest outbound 
investors. 
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A couple of years later, Kuznetsov continued a relevant study for the 
purpose of this research [16]. He found that there is notable gender inequali-
ty on the board of Russia’s 20 largest multinational enterprises. The percent-
age of women on boards was just five percent. The women representation 
did not seem to depend on the companies’ ownership structure or their field 
of industry. 
To summarise, none of the aforementioned studies concentrated exactly 
on the theme of this article, i. e. foreign members of the boards of Russia’s 
largest investors overseas. The observations of the studies above may be re-
garded as side findings, though nevertheless important for this study, since 
these two aforementioned works offer a historical reference point for the 
analysis. The author was unable to find any other work focusing on precisely 
the same theme. 
 
2.2. Earlier research in a non-Russian context 
 
Sanders and Carpenter used several datasets to collect their data on ap-
proximately 250 large US firms [17]. They discovered that a large board size 
was positively associated with internationalisation. Furthermore, the propor-
tion of outsiders on the board was also positively related to a company’s de-
gree of internationalisation. 
Sherman et al. analysed seven regional US telecommunications compa-
nies. They found little information to support the indication that board char-
acteristics were related to a company’s internationalisation [18]. Similarly, 
Lien et al., having analysed over 200 publicly listed companies in Taiwan, 
concluded that there is only limited statistical support for the impact of board 
characteristics upon the decision to undertake FDI [19]. 
Datta et al. used a dataset consisting of almost 400 acquisitions and 200 
joint ventures, in the US manufacturing sector [20]. Their findings indicate 
that companies with boards characterised by a higher proportion of outside 
directors, independent leadership structures and firms having the positions of 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chairman of the Board are more inclined 
to favour acquisitions over joint ventures, in their foreign market entry. The 
aforementioned finding is supported by Majocchi and Strange, who found 
that if the board of a family-owned company has a higher proportion of in-
dependent directors, then international diversification is greater [21]. 
Barroso et al. studied 45 listed Spanish companies [22]. They concluded 
that the tendency for board members to remain longer on the board of direc-
tors has a negative influence on the company’s degree of international diver-
sification. Their research findings do not support the hypothesis related to 
the influence of a board’s international background on the company’s degree 
of international diversification. Finally, the authors argue that the most inter-
nationalised enterprises require a higher level of education for its members. 
Masulis et al. analysed nearly 10,000 US companies, during the period 
of 1998—2006 [23]. Their findings suggest that companies with foreign in-
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dependent directors on their boards make better cross-border acquisitions, 
when they pursue targets from the home regions of foreign independent di-
rectors. They also found that companies with foreign board members pay 
their CEOs excessively high compensation. On the other hand, they are less 
responsive to replacing poorly performing CEOs. 
Oxelheim et al. surveyed some 350 non-financial Nordic companies dur-
ing 2001—2008 [24]. The authors found, unsurprisingly, that the nationality 
of foreign board members tends to match the nationality of foreign owners 
and the country in which a company cross-lists its shares. The findings also 
suggest that a foreign strategic owner is associated with the appointment of a 
foreign board member. Moreover, companies with a higher percentage of 
foreign sales, more foreign ownership and whose shares are cross-listed on 
foreign stock exchanges have more internationalised boards of directors. De-
spite the aforementioned finding, the authors do not claim unidirectional 
causality, as board internationalisation may drive, as well as be driven by, 
company internationalisation. Furthermore, scholars argue that board partic-
ipation by foreign directors is primarily related to financial internationalisa-
tion, rather than foreign sales and hence, presumably, to monitoring rather 
than advisory functions. A large company size is positively linked with the 
presence of foreign directors, as smaller companies may find it difficult to 
attract foreign directors to their boards. 
Earlier studies indicate that there is ambiguous support for the impact of 
board characteristics upon either internationalisation, in general, or the FDI 
decision, in particular. Researchers are not certain about the causality be-
tween board composition and internationalisation, as board internationalisa-
tion may drive, as well as be driven by a company’s internationalisation. De-
spite the aforementioned ambiguities, some earlier research on foreign board 
members suggests that there seems to be a connection between foreign own-
ership, the scope and intensity of foreign business activities and the role of 
foreigners on the board of directors of the company. It is worth observing 
that foreign directors more frequently perform a monitoring function rather 
than that of an advisory role in an enterprise, i. e. foreign board members 
more often act as financial controllers sent by the foreign owners, rather than 
as business developers. The author was unable to find any studies focusing 
on the relationship between participation of female foreign nationals and 
outbound FDI expansion. 
 
 
3. Research findings 
 
Thirty foreigners have been admitted to the boards of directors of Rus-
sia’s ten largest investors abroad. In other words, on average three foreigners 
operate in each of these enterprises. Even if further studies are required, it 
might well be that the boards of Russia’s largest corporations are more inter-
national than those of their counterparts in China or the USA, for instance. 
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A foreign board member is a more frequent occurrence in Russia’s big-
gest investors abroad than in Russia’s largest corporations as a whole. Al-
most 30 percent of all board seats are occupied by foreigners in the ten en-
terprises with the biggest assets abroad. The respective share in Russia’s 50 lar-
gest corporations is 20 percent [25]. This finding implies that there seems to 
be a correlation between an intensive FDI expansion abroad and a larger for-
eign representation on the board of directors. 
Twelve nationalities can be found in the board rooms of the studied cor-
porations. The American, British and German board directors occupy two 
thirds of the board seats that foreigners have received in Russia’s largest in-
vestors abroad. A Chinese board director is still a rarity in Russia’s most 
significant companies. In fact, just one Chinese citizen has found her way 
onto a board (table 3, fig. 3). 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Number of foreign board directors in Russia’s  
10 largest non-financial corporations investing overseas (divided by nationality) 
 
Abbreviations: AT = Austria, CH = Switzerland, CN = China, DE = Germany, 
DK = Denmark, GB = Great Britain, IT = Italy, LB = Lebanon, NL = The Nether-
lands, NO = Norway, US = The United States of America and ZA = South Africa. 
 
Russia’s metallurgical companies have accepted the greatest number 
(12) of foreigners onto their boards of directors. More than a third of all seats 
given to foreigners in the studied companies can be found in metallurgy. 
Metallurgy is followed by the oil and gas sector. Eight foreign board seats 
are in the oil and gas industry. The American board directors play a visible 
role in Russia’s oil and energy industry. Scandinavians occupy board seats in 
telecommunications (Table 4). 
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Table 4 
 
Foreign board directors in Russia’s ten non-financial corporations abroad  
(divided by industry and turnover) 
 
Industry/turnover Below $5 billion $5—10 billion Over $10 billion 
Oil and gas (8) — — Total: 8 
5 US, 1 CH,  
1 DE, 1 GB 
Transport & logistics (3) Total: 2 
1 GB, 1 LB 
— Total: 1 
1 DE 
Metallurgy (12) — Total: 12 
3 US, 2 AT,  
2 GB, 1 ZA, 
1 CN, 1 DE,  
1 IT, 1 NL 
— 
Telecommunications (5) — Total: 5 
2 NO, 1 DK, 
1 GB, 1 US 
— 
Production of metal pipelines (2) Total: 2 
2 US 
— — 
Grand total (30) (4) (17) (9) 
 
Abbreviations: AT = Austria, CH = Switzerland, CN = China, DE = Germany, 
DK = Denmark, GB = Great Britain, IT = Italy, LB = Lebanon, NL = The Nether-
lands, NO = Norway, US = The United States of America and ZA = South Africa. 
 
In the following part of the article, the internationalisation and the board 
composition of Russia’s ten biggest companies investing overseas are ana-
lysed case by case. The analysis begins with Gazprom, Russia’s biggest in-
vestor abroad. At the end of 2014, the total value of Gazprom’s foreign as-
sets reached $36 billion, meaning that its foreign assets accounted for 13 per-
cent of the corporation’s total assets [10]. The majority of Gazprom is owned 
by the Russian State. In 2016, nearly 220 billion cubic meters of Gazprom’s 
gas was exported, i. e. more than a half of the corporation’s gas production. 
Since the export price for natural gas is higher than the domestic gas price in 
Russia, Gazprom received nearly three-quarters of its revenues from its ex-
ports. Gazprom has a presence in most European countries. In addition to 
Europe, Gazprom has established its presence in Africa, the Americas and 
Asia [26]. 
Viktor Zubkov, the Prime Minister of Russia in 2007—2008, acts as 
Chairman of the Gazprom Board. In addition to the former Prime Minister, 
the Minister of Energy, Alexander Novak, and the Minister of Economic 
Development, Alexey Ulyukaev, secure the functioning government rela-
tions of the corporation1. None of the 11 board members of Gazprom can be 
                                                     
1 Alexey Ulyukaev was arrested in mid-November 2016 for corruption [32]. The cor-
ruption allegation is not linked to Gazprom, but a possible bribe from Rosneft [33]. 
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considered foreigners, according to the classification of a foreigner used in 
this study (see Chapter 1). On the other hand, the board has established a 
close connection to the Kazakh President, since one of Gazprom’s Board 
Members previously served as a part-time advisor to the president of Ka-
zakhstan2. Dmitry Patrushev, a son of Nikolai Patrushev, the former head of 
the FSB and head of the Russian Federation Security Council, joined the 
Gazprom Board of Directors in 2016 [27; 28]. 
The board members’ educational background is mainly Russia since the 
majority of board members studied at Russia’s top universities. Only one of 
the board members reported that he had studied abroad and only one of the 
board members worked in a foreign company based outside the former 
USSR. Around half of the board members have a personal, educational or 
professional connection to St. Petersburg (Leningrad), the city Russia’s Pres-
ident Vladimir Putin comes from. 
Taking into account the huge corporate responsibility, the average age of 
the board is surprisingly young (55 years), the oldest member being 75 years 
old and the youngest one being under 40 years. The board of Gazprom is 
highly masculine since no female directors acted as a member of the board at 
the beginning of 2017 [27]. 
Lukoil is Russia’s second most multinational enterprise. The corpora-
tion’s first international operation took place in Azerbaijan in 1994. Now, 
the company is present in over 30 countries. In 2016, almost 15 percent of 
the corporation’s production took place outside Russia [29]. Lukoil’s foreign 
assets are valued at more than $30 billion and they cover nearly 30 percent 
of the company’s total assets, indicating that the corporation is both commit-
ted to international operations and highly dependent on them [10]. 
The Lukoil Board has 10 members. Two of the Russian board members 
worked as a deputy minister in the Soviet ministry of energy. One of them, 
Vagit Alekperov, managed to collect an extraordinarily huge ownership 
stake in the company (over 20 percent). In addition, Igor Ivanov, Russia’s 
Minister of Foreign Affairs (1998—2004) and Secretary of the Security 
Council (2004—2007) brings government knowledge to the board. 
The company’s 2015 annual report reveals that the Russian board mem-
bers have not extensively studied abroad and their international work experi-
ence is surprisingly scarce. The average age of the board (70 years) is even 
more surprising since oil business is generally regarded as a dynamic busi-
ness field. Chairman of the Lukoil Board will celebrate his 90th birthday this 
decade [29—31]. Such a board age structure does not necessarily give an 
impression of experience and dynamism, but rather an impression of old age 
and immobility. 
Foreigners occupy 40 percent of the Lukoil Board seats: two Americans, 
one Briton, and one Suisse have managed to acquire board seats. Interesting-
                                                     
2 Timur Askarovich Kulibaev holds Kazakh citizenship, but as he was born in Al-
maty, the Soviet Republic of Kazakhstan, he is not regarded as a foreigner in this 
study. Kulibaev is the son-in-law of Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev [34]. In 
addition to Kulibaev, Alexander Novak was born outside the Russian Federation, 
namely in the Soviet Republic of Ukraine [26]. 
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ly, only one of the foreigners can be considered as a heavyweight in the in-
ternational oil business, which shows that business experience has not been 
the main criterion for choosing foreign board members. This may indicate 
that foreign Lukoil directors exercise a controlling function rather than have 
an advisory role in the board. On the other hand, foreign directors have good 
connections with business circles in their own countries. For example, for-
eign board members have memberships in their national chambers of com-
merce, business associations and clubs linked to Russia that allows them to 
influence the image of Russia back home. One female director has found her 
way into this masculine field of business [31]. 
Although VimpelCom’s headquarters are currently located in the Nether-
lands and the principal owner is nominally from Luxembourg, the company 
can still be regarded as Russian, since it is controlled by Russia’s second-
richest oligarch, Mikhail Fridman [34]. The corporation has over 200 million 
customers in over ten countries. Russia is the main clientele base, with near-
ly 60 million customers. In 2014, VimpelCom’s assets abroad were valued at 
$30 billion and three-quarters of the company’s assets were located outside 
Russia [10]. When VimpelCom’s skyrocketing internationalisation is as-
sessed, it needs to be remembered that the company’s foreign expansion on-
ly began in 2004, when VimpelCom entered the Kazakh market [35]. 
Five out of nine VimpelCom board members are foreigners and they are 
mainly from Scandinavia. The ownership of Telenor, a Norwegian telecom, 
explains such a large representation of Scandinavians on the VimpelCom 
Board. Four Russians serve as supervisory board members, of whom one is 
its chairman. Mikhail Fridman holds a board seat in the company as well. 
The board members have received their education in some of the most 
respected educational institutions of Europe and the USA. Their formal ex-
perience related to either the Russian Government or other national govern-
ments is rather narrow. Only one board member reported that he had worked 
in a Norwegian ministry. When assessing this member’s government experi-
ence, it became clear that his ministerial career dates back to the end of the 
1970’s and the 1980’s, and it is not in the field of telecommunications. De-
spite the shortage of government experience, vis-à-vis the Russian Govern-
ment, one may assume that Mikhail Fridman, a Russian billionaire and a 
board member, possesses functional relations with the Russian political 
leadership. 
The VimpelCom board is relatively young: the average age of the super-
visory board is just 53 years. Such a young age is a comparative advantage 
in a highly dynamic field of business. No females have entered the Vimpel-
Com board, as yet [36]. 
Rosneft was a domestic market-oriented corporation, until the early 
years of this millennium, but its international expansion has sped up since 
then. As a result of this internationalisation, the company has established its 
substantial presence in over 20 countries [37]. Despite top management’s 
growing interest in foreign expansion, Rosneft has only lightly invested out-
side Russia. The group’s foreign assets are valued at less than $10 billion 
and just six percent of the enterprise’s total assets were located abroad [10]. 
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Rosneft Board has nine members, with an average age of 60 years. No 
females have been accepted to the board of directors. Four board directors 
are foreigners: three US citizens and a German. None of the Russian board 
members reported that they had studied abroad and only one provided in-
formation about international work experience. 
The board seems to be well connected with the Russian president, as the 
chairman of the board is an assistant to the Russian president. Besides, Igor 
Sechin, Rosneft’s Vice-Chairman, presumably is rather close to the Russian 
president, since he acted as deputy head of the executive office of the Rus-
sian president in 2000—2008, and later he was deputy prime minister until 
2012. Moreover, the incumbent Russian minister of energy holds a seat on 
the board. Another influential personality, Andrey Akimov, who is a mem-
ber of Gazprom Board, needs to be mentioned here. The German board 
member Matthias Warnig, Managing Director of Nord Stream 2, is another 
noteworthy personality. BP, in turn, has added its president to Rosneft 
Board. A former senior director of ExxonMobil also holds a seat [38]. 
The headquarters of Evraz have been located in London for a decade. 
Despite the location of its headquarters in Great Britain, Evraz can be classi-
fied as a Russian-controlled metal company, as approximately 80 percent of 
its share capital is held by Russian tycoons [34; 39]. The company started its 
expansion abroad in 2005. Now, Evraz is present in eight countries: Canada, 
the Czech Republic, Italy, Kazakhstan, Switzerland, Ukraine, the United 
Kingdom and the USA. At the end of 2014, Evraz foreign assets totalled 
$5 billion, which is nearly half of the corporation’s total asset value [10]. 
Despite the fact that the main metal deposits of Evraz are located in Russia, 
the large share of foreign sales and foreign assets makes the company highly 
dependent on foreign markets. 
Evraz Board consists of eight members, whose average age is 57 years. 
Since the company is private, the owners has probably decided to avoid hav-
ing high-level civil servants. In other words, the board consists more of 
business-minded directors than of government-sent supervisors. Three out of 
eight of its board members are foreign nationals. Two come from Great Brit-
ain and the third board member is from Austria. Only woman sits on Evraz 
Board [39]. 
Sovcomflot (SCF) has nearly 150 vessels, with a total deadweight of 
12 million tonnes. The company’s oil tankers cover over 90 percent of these 
deadweight tonnes [40]. SCF foreign assets exceed 80 percent of the сompa-
ny’s total assets, which gives a clear indication that flagging ships overseas 
plays an elementary role in the overall internationalisation of Sovcomflot 
[10]. Tax planning is probably behind the flagging of the ships abroad. 
SFC has nine board members, the average age of whom is 59 years. The 
chairman of the board previously acted as a representative of the Russian 
president for the North-West Federal District and three of the board mem-
bers have previously served as deputy ministers in the Russian government. 
It is interesting to note that two SCF board members are also members of 
Zarubezhneft, Russia’s tenth biggest investor abroad. None of the directors 
on the board is women [41]. 
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Two of SFC’s directors are foreign nationals, one being a Briton and the 
other is a Lebanese citizen with a close connection to US business circles. 
Previously, the British citizen was involved with Lloyd’s Register and the 
Lebanese citizen worked for Morgan Stanley. Thus, these foreign board 
members bring to the Sovcomflot Board additional expertise on international 
shipping and international finance. 
Rusal’s internationalisation began in 2002, when the company acquired a 
foil mill in Armenia and a mining complex in Guinea. By now, the company 
has established its business presence in a dozen foreign countries, namely 
Armenia, Australia, China, Guinea, Guyana, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Kazakh-
stan, Nigeria, Sweden and Ukraine [42]. The value of Rusal’s foreign assets 
was estimated to have reached almost $3 billion, as of the end of 2014 [10]. 
Rusal has an amazingly large board of 18 directors. Rusal Board size is ap-
proximately twice as large as the average board size in companies of a simi-
lar size. The average age of the Rusal Board is 53 years. As the metal busi-
ness is regarded as a male dominated business, it is surprising to encounter 
four women on the board, with one of them being a foreigner. 
None of the Russian board members have served in the Russian Gov-
ernment. Should the Russian board members lack government experience, 
some foreign board members have had formal links to the governmental 
structures within their countries, such as Philip Lader, former White House 
deputy chief of staff, and Elsie Leung Oi-Sie, a committee member of the 
National People’s Congress of China. Another influential foreign board 
member should be mentioned here: Matthias Warnig, the German managing 
director of Gazprom-controlled Nord Stream 2, is a board member of Ros-
neft and Transneft [43]. 
Russian Railways (RZD) currently carries passengers to 30 countries in 
Europe and Asia [44]. The foreign assets of RZD totalled approximately 
$3 billion, as of the end of 2014, representing four percent of the RZD total 
assets [10]. The company’s 12-member board is led by the incumbent deputy 
prime minister. In addition to the deputy prime minister, the company has 
substantial government experience, as Russia’s ex-prime minister, two depu-
ty ministers and a former deputy minister sit on the board. In other words, 
almost half of the RZD Board has some sort of ministerial experience. De-
spite such a wide ministerial praxis, the average age of the board is surpris-
ingly low, i. e. approximately 52 years. No females have gained membership 
on the RZD Board. Several board members have studied at the world’s lead-
ing universities, such as Harvard Business School, Stanford University and 
Wharton School of Business. Although several board members have studied 
abroad and have gained international work experience, one may conclude 
that the board’s knowledge in international business is somewhat narrow. 
Hartmut Medorn is one of RZD foreign board members. Until May 2009, 
Hartmut Medorn served as CEO of Deutsche Bahn, Germany’s largest rail-
way company. He is clearly the oldest board member at Russian Railways. 
Medorn celebrated his 75th birthday in July 2017 [45]. 
TMK is a privately-owned producer of metal pipelines. The exports 
formed nearly 30 percent of the company’s total revenues, in 2016. In 2006, 
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the company started its foreign production in Romania. Currently, TMK op-
erates in Canada, Kazakhstan, Oman, Romania and the USA (TMK 2017a). 
The enterprise’s foreign assets were valued at $2.5 billion, at the end of 
2014, representing over 40 percent of its total assets [10]. 
The TMK board consists of 12 members. The average age of the board 
members is 55 years. No females have received a seat on the board. Even if 
the TMK Board has been built around professionalism, two former ministers 
have received a seat on the board. These two board members are unique per-
sonalities since they have also gained broad business experience. One of 
them is the president of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepre-
neurs and the other one is the chairman of Rusnano. 
Two foreigners have entered the TMK Board. Both are US citizens and 
are highly experienced in international finance and doing business in Russia. 
It is rather peculiar that one of the foreign directors has previously served as 
press officer for the US Treasury Department [47]. 
Zarubezhneft currently has assets in Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Cuba, and Vietnam [48]. The value of these foreign assets was $2.4 billion, 
at the end of 2014. The foreign operations are of strategic importance to Za-
rubezhneft, as two-thirds of the enterprise’s assets are located abroad [10]. 
The board of directors consists of seven directors. As the chairman is a 
former FSB heavyweight, it is no surprise to see foreigners on the board of 
Zarubezhneft. In addition to the security connection, board members also 
possess ministerial experience and broad knowledge of the oil business. 
Some of the board members were educated in the leading educational institu-
tions of Russia and Western Europe. In spite of modern corporate govern-
ance ingredients and the relatively young age of the board (approximately 
55 years), the current operations of Zarubezhneft are, to some extent, still 
shadowed by the historic burden of secrecy [49]. 
To sum up, the board size of Russia’s ten largest non-financial compa-
nies investing abroad varies from seven to 18 members, the average being 
10.5. The lowest average age of board members in Russia’s ten biggest 
companies investing overseas, was 52 years old, while the highest was 
70 years old. Surprisingly, the lowest average age was in the state-owned 
Russian Railways and the highest average age was in the privately driven oil 
company, Lukoil. It is interesting to note that the foreign board members 
were often older than the average age of their board. The average age of the 
foreign board members, in Russia’s ten biggest investors abroad, was 
62 years. By selecting older foreigners for their boards, the Russian corpora-
tions may receive more experience, but whether or not they also receive the 
necessary dynamism and the latest corporate governance know-how is al-
ready a debatable issue. 
Three out of Russia’s ten biggest investors abroad have invited at least 
one woman onto their board. One can find six female board members in 
Russia’s ten biggest investors abroad. Three of these female directors were 
foreign citizens and another three Russians, which means that females occu-
py around five percent of the board seats in Russia’s ten biggest companies 
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investing outside the country. The situation for female directors in Russia’s 
50 largest corporations is, more or less, the same, i. e. six percent [25]. The 
aforementioned finding indicates that the internationalisation of Russian 
companies has not improved the chances for women to enter the board of 
directors, and hence, it can be concluded that Russia is still a rather mascu-
line working environment. However, Russia is not an exemption, when we 
approach gender equality, from a global perspective. 
 
 
4. Discussion 
 
The boards of Russia’s ten largest corporations investing overseas are 
more international than generally believed, 30 percent of board members are 
foreigners, born outside the former USSR3. The respective share is 20 per-
cent in Russia’s 50 largest corporations [25]. The aforementioned finding is 
in line with the results of Oxelheim et al. [24], who argued that there is a 
correlation between an outward FDI activity and the internalisation of the 
boards. In order to verify whether the outbound investments have caused the 
board internationalisation or vice versa, the entry dates of the foreign board 
members and the timing of the main FDI deals should be investigated. Even if 
further studies are required, in all likelihood the outward FDI was the driver 
for board internationalisation in the Russian context and not vice versa. 
This research suggests that foreign board members exercise both a moni-
toring function and an advisory function in the Russian corporations. In oth-
er words, foreign board members act as both foreign owners’ watchdogs and 
as the Russian owners’ business advisors. In addition to these two conven-
tional roles, some foreign board members, due to their political background, 
may be used for an unofficial dialogue between Russia and foreign govern-
ments or they can act as unofficial foreign spokesmen of the company out-
side Russia. The penetration of Russian security organs into the corporate 
governance of some of the studied corporations creates some suspicion over 
the aforementioned dialogue. Further investigation is needed, in this field of 
research. 
One can find as many state-owned enterprises in Russia’s ten biggest in-
vestors abroad as in private companies. Thus, industry membership, i. e. the 
field of a company’s operation, may explain the outward FDI expansion 
more than the corporate governance characteristics do. 
Women occupy around five percent of the board seats in Russia’s ten larg-
est outward investing companies. The share of female directors in Russia’s 50 
largest corporations is more or less the same [25]. This finding implies that the 
internationalisation of Russian companies has not improved the chances for 
women to enter the board of directors. It is interesting to note that the share of 
women in 2016 is exactly the same as five years earlier [16]4. 
                                                     
3 The share of foreigners has not changed between 2008 and 2016 [15]. 
4 In 2015, the share of women in 3,000 global companies is nearly three times larger 
than in Russia, i.e. approximately 15 percent [50].  
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The American, British and German board directors occupy two thirds of 
the board seats that foreigners have in Russia’s largest investors abroad. A 
Chinese board director is still a rarity in Russia’s most significant compa-
nies. It would be especially interesting to monitor how the number of the 
Chinese board members in Russia’s most significant enterprises changes in 
the future. 
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